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THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: FROM PRIVACY NOTICES TO
EFFECTIVE TRANSPARENCY1
Paula J. Bruening*
Mary J. Culnan**
Openness is the first fundamental principle of fair information
practices with “notice” serving to practically implement openness
in most commercial transactions. However, current notices have
been widely criticized as being too complex, legalistic, lengthy, and
opaque. This Article argues that to achieve the openness required
by the first fair information practice principle, data protection and
privacy should move from a “notice” model to an environment of
“transparency.” It asserts that the terms “notice” and
“transparency” are not synonymous and that different definitions
apply to each.
The Article begins by reviewing the history of notice in the
United States and its traditional roles in privacy and data
protection. It considers the challenges and limitations of notice, and
the attempts to address them and the lessons learned from these
efforts. The Article also examines the implications of emerging
technologies and data uses such as mobile apps, big data analytics
and the Internet of Things for traditional notice. This Article
proposes that what is needed is a move from notice to an
environment of transparency that includes improved notices,
attention to contextual norms, integrating the design of notices into
system development as part of privacy-by-design, public education,
and new technological solutions. Finally, it presents arguments for
business buy-in and regulatory guidance. While the historical
1

The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors. An earlier version
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Berkeley, California, June 2015. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Lorrie
Cranor, Robert Gellman, David Hoffman, Anne Klinefelter, Mary Madden, Dawn
Schrader and the PLSC attendees on the earlier version.
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review is limited to the experience in the U.S., the proposals for
creating an environment of transparency can apply across
jurisdictions. Further, while transparency is necessary but not
sufficient for assuring fair data use, a discussion of issues related to
the full complement of the fair information principles is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The first principle of fair information practices states that
“[t]here shall be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very
existence is secret and there shall be a policy of openness about an
organization’s personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and
systems.” 2 This principle requires that organizations make their
information practices visible to the public. Effective implementation
of this principle is essential to promoting fairness. A lack of
openness potentially enables organizations to collect and use
information without protections and outside the scrutiny of
regulators, consumers, or privacy advocates.
Since the late 1970s, what has commonly been referred to as
“notice” has served to practically establish openness in most
commercial transactions. 3 Notice has been relied upon to inform
individuals’ decisions about the collection, processing, sharing, and
reuse of their personal information. In the United States, notice has
also served as the basis for regulation by the Federal Trade
Commission under Section 5 of the FTC Act,4 which provides that
companies whose practices are at odds with what is stated in their
notices may be prosecuted for deception. 5 The European Data
Protection Directive specifies the information about data collection,
processing, and sharing that must be provided to individuals.6 The
2

In a 1973 report, a U.S. government advisory committee initially proposed
and named Fair Information Practices as a set of principles for protecting the
privacy of personal data in record-keeping systems. The Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems issued the report. Records,
Computers and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html
[hereinafter Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens]. See p. 41 for a list
of the original Fair Information Practices.
3
Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy
Protection Study Commission, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
(1977), https://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/.
4
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
5
Id. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION:
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (Cambridge University Press 2016) (discussing
privacy policy and the FTC).
6
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 (EU).
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework 7 states that data
controllers should provide clear and easily accessible statements that
articulate their practices and policies with respect to personal
information.8
Notice arguably fosters openness by requiring companies to
make public the business models, vendor relationships, and data
practices that drive the digital economy. However, since the mid1990s, both online and offline notices have been criticized by
regulators, privacy advocates, and businesses as being too complex,
legalistic, lengthy, and opaque. Questions about how notices could
be improved figure prominently in nearly every discussion about
privacy. Businesses complain of the challenge of writing notices that
meet regulators’ requirements for completeness, while consumer
advocates call for clarity and concise, consumer-friendly language.
Notices that support individual choice about subsequent use of
personal information, often are written in language that allows
companies such latitude that consent authorizes nearly any data use.
As a result, notices are often perceived as doing little to promote the
individual’s informed decisions about whether or not to provide his
or her data.
Rapid changes in technology further strain the ability of
companies to provide useful notice. Ubiquitous deployment of
sensors, advances in big data, real-time analytics, and the complex
7

APEC: Privacy Framework, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (2005)
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/
Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx.
8
As discussed here, articulations of fair information practices take different
forms in different jurisdictions. Issues related to individual awareness and notice
can be found within all of them. In this paper, the starting point of the analysis is
the fair information practices as the FTC and the White House have articulated
them. The FTC’s version has been criticized as being too limited and as having
excluded several important principles (e.g., purpose specification). The White
House adopted a more inclusive version of the Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs) in its 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Moreover, in
current discussions of privacy governance, some companies have returned to
analysis of a more comprehensive articulation of fair information practices as they
seek guidance that addresses issues raised by big data analytics, fosters
interoperability with non-US privacy laws, and promotes robust global data flows.
Achieving the openness described in the first principle challenges organizations
regardless of which version of fair information practices they adopted.
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vendor relationships and data sharing partnerships that characterize
today’s data ecosystem challenge organizations’ ability to explain
their data practices. The need to use data robustly and in innovative
ways clashes with requirements that notices specify a particular
purpose or use for the data collected. The degree to which data
collection is integrated into infrastructures (such as intelligent
vehicle highway systems) or environments (such as retail locations
or public spaces) can make posting notice difficult, and new
technologies such as mobile devices with small screens create new
challenges for providing meaningful notice.
Currently, a single privacy notice is expected to support many
functions, including regulation, consumer choice, and public
education about data practices. This Article argues that the current
and emerging data ecosystems call for considering whether the
current notice model can continue to serve all of these purposes.
Moreover, it raises the question whether notices alone can create the
conditions necessary to ensure that there are “no personal data
record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret” as stated in
the first principle of fair information practices.9
This Article argues that to achieve the openness required by the
first fair information practice principle, data protection and privacy
should move from a “notice” model to one of “transparency.” It also
asserts that the terms “notice” and “transparency” are not
synonymous and that different definitions apply to each. It also
defines notice as the posted articulation of a company’s privacy
practices and policies. In contrast, transparency is a condition of
disclosure and openness jointly created by companies and policy
makers through the use of a variety of approaches, including notice.
This Article argues that notice is an essential tool for creating
transparency, but that establishing transparency requires far more
than notice. It requires implementing the measures necessary to
create an environment of transparency. Whether transparency is
achieved depends not only on the posting of information but also on

9

Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, supra note 2.
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the perceived quality of the disclosure.10 It argues that the Authors’
experience with notice over the last twenty years demonstrates that
a single notice cannot fully inform consumers, regulators, and the
public about data practices. Rather, to achieve the transparency
required by the first principle of fair information practices—
particularly given the complexity of the emerging data ecosystem—organizations must employ a variety of tools that support
the various functions notice alone was once intended to serve.
Creating a transparent data environment requires an understanding
of these functions. It also involves understanding the limitations of
traditional notice. Importantly, it requires identifying the various
audiences that must be served and the needs of each.
This Article also reviews the history of notice in the United
States and its traditional role in privacy and data protection. It
considers the challenges and limitations of notice; the attempts of
business, government, experts, and technologists to address them;
and the lessons learned from these efforts. It also examines the
implications of emerging technologies and data uses for notices.
Finally, it proposes ways in which effective transparency can be
achieved, including the role of notice. It is important to note that this
Article is limited to the issues related to notice and to fostering
transparency. The authors recognize the importance of the full
complement of fair information practice principles and that
transparency alone is not sufficient to assure the fair use of data. The
authors also recognize the importance of meaningful choice or
consent and that notice as it is currently implemented is the
mechanism by which individuals now learn about their opportunity
to consent or choose if available.11 However, issues related to the
current implementation of the other fair information practices
principles are beyond the scope of this Article.

10

See A.K. Schnackenberg and E.C. Tomilson, Organizational Transparency:
A New Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder
Relationships, JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (2014).
11
The history of notice reflected in this paper is admittedly limited to the United
States. However, many of the strengths and limitations of notice revealed by this
experience are relevant across jurisdictions.
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II.
BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF NOTICE
In his seminal work, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin
discussed individuals’ awareness about the collection, processing,
and storage of data as one means to protect against the unfair
treatment that can result when inaccurate information is used or
shared to make decisions about them.12 His work emphasized that
when individuals do not know that information systems exist, they
cannot challenge either a particular use or disclosure, or the
decisions that result.13
Notice first emerged as a mechanism to achieve awareness and
a basis for promoting legitimate use of personal information when
large-scale computerized systems emerged in the 1970s. In the
1990s, the Internet and e-commerce renewed discussion about the
need to provide notice to individuals about the collection and use of
personal data. This Article briefly reviews the evolution of notice in
the United States beginning in the 1970s through the release in 2012
of major privacy reports by both the White House and the Federal
Trade Commission.14 This Article also discusses how 21st century
technologies such as mobile applications, big data analytics, and the
Internet of Things challenge the utility of traditional notice and the
ability to effectively provide it.
A. The Origins of Notice
In the early 1970s, then Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Elliot Richardson, established the Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Automated Data Systems in response to growing
public concerns about the harmful consequences of widespread use

12

ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (New York: Antheneum, 1970).
In particular, see Chapter 7, “The Revolution in Information Collection and
Processing: Data Surveillance.”
13
Id. at 160.
14
We limit our review to the evolution of notice as an element of fair
information principles in the United States. For a comparative analysis of fair
information principles outside the U.S., see FRED H. CATE, THE FAILURE OF FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, IN CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF
THE INFORMATION ECONOMY (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“Failure of Fair
Information Practice Principles”).
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of computer and telecommunications technology. 15 The
Committee’s report, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens,
articulated the original Code of Fair Information Practices. The first
of these states that, “[t]here must be no personal-data recording
keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”16 The report called
for any organization maintaining an administrative personal data
system to provide public notice once a year and detailed what
information the notice should include.17
In 1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act,18 designed to regulate
the federal government’s collection and protection of information
about citizens.19 The Act’s key requirements are based on principles
of fair information practices.20 The Privacy Act also called for the
creation of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (“PPSC”),
charging it with examining a wide range of record-keeping practices
and privacy issues arising in the public sector and in a variety of
commercial environments.21 In its 1977 report, the PPSC articulated
objectives for data protection systems 22 and reiterated the
15

Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, supra note 2.
Id. For a more complete history of the Code, see Robert Gellman, Fair
Information Practices: A Basic History, Version 2.12, August 2014, available at
http://www.bobgellman.com.
17
Id. at 49.
18
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2016).
19
The Privacy Act requires agencies collecting information to, inter alia,
“inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which it
uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the
individual— (A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order
of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether
disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary; (B) the principal
purpose or purposes for which the information is intended to be used; (C) the
routine uses which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to
paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection; and (D) the effects on him, if any, of not
providing all or any part of the requested information . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 522 (e)(3)
[hereinafter PRIVACY].
20
Fair Information Practices (FIPS) refer to a set of principles designed to guide
organization in the collection, use and protection of personal data. They serve as
a basis for law and self-regulation throughout the world.
21
Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy
Protection Study Commission, supra note 3.
22
Privacy Act of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 5, as amended by
Act of June 1, 1977 Pub. L. No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179, established the Privacy
16
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importance of openness to fairness. The report included
recommendations related to a variety of data uses, among them
direct marketing mailing lists.23 The PPSC was asked to investigate
whether a party that engages in interstate commerce and maintains
a mailing list should be required to remove an individual’s name and
address from that list, absent an exception in law.24 However, the
report instead recommended that private sector organizations that
share their mailing lists with third parties provide notice of this
practice to the individuals on the list and provide an opportunity for
individuals to opt out of sharing. 25 The report recommendation
effectively articulated what is now referred to as “notice and choice”
for the first time.26

Protection Study Commission and provided that the Commission study data
banks, automated data processing programs and information systems of
government, regional and private organizations to determine standards and
procedures in force for protection of personal information. It further charged the
Commission with reporting to the President and Congress the extent to which
requirements and principles of the Privacy Act should be applied to the
information practices of those organizations, and that making other legislative
recommendations to protect the privacy of individuals while meeting government
and society’s legitimate need for information. See PRIVACY, supra note 19.
23
Privacy Act, supra note 22.
24
Privacy Act of 1974 § 5(c)(2)(B)(i).
25
PRIVACY, supra note 19. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information
Practices Principles in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY (Jane K. Winn ed., Ashgate Publishing 2006). In 1997, the Direct
Marketing Association voted to make compliance with this form of “notice and
choice” a requirement for DMA membership beginning in 1999. See DIRECT
MARKETING ASS’N, PRIVACY PROMISE: MEMBER COMPLIANCE GUIDE (1999).
26
Notice became an established global principle for privacy in 1980 when the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued its
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flow of
Personal Data (c(80)58/FINAL) (Sept. 23, 1980 amended on July 11, 2013),
available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotec
tionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#top. These guidelines have
served as the basis for law, regulation, international agreement and industry best
practices, most notably the European Union’s Directive 95/46/EC on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection; supra note 7.
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B. Online Privacy and Notice
In the 1990s, the promise of a new National Information
Infrastructure27 (“NII”) brought with it recognition that new privacy
risks threatened the benefits the Internet promised. In 1993, Vice
President Gore created the Information Infrastructure Task Force
(“IITF”), and he charged it with developing comprehensive policies
and programs that would promote the development of the NII.28 A
Privacy Working Group was created within the IITF, and in June
1995 it released Privacy and the National Information
Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal
Information. 29 Included was a notice principle requiring that
individuals be given sufficient information to make an informed
decision about his or her privacy. 30 The role of notice was
subsequently reinforced in the 1997 White House Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce,31 which stated that the IITF privacy
principles, built on the 1980 OECD Guidelines, 32 require that
“[d]ata-gatherers should inform consumer what information they are
collecting and how they intend to use such data[.]”33
In the 1990s, the FTC began a separate consumer privacy
initiative to examine and understand online privacy issues. In 1996,
it reported that participants in a workshop on online privacy
generally agreed that notice of information practices is a first
principle, essential to advancing privacy online; they disagreed,

27

The term “NII” resulted from the High Performance Computing Act of 1991
(Pub L. No. 102-94,15 U.S.C. §5501). It became a popular buzzword during the
Clinton Administration.
28
Options for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure:
Draft for Public Comment, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Apr. 1, 1997),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/legacy-page/options-promoting-privacy-142716.
29
Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for
Providing and Using Personal Information, Final Report, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERV. (June 6, 1995), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/niiprivp.htm.
30
Id.
31
President William Clinton, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,
THE WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997), http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/
Commerce/read.html [hereinafter The White House].
32
OECD, supra note 26.
33
The White House, supra note 31.
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however, about the substance of privacy notices.34 In 1998, the FTC
analyzed the content of a sample of commercial websites to
determine how many of them posted privacy notices, and among
those that did, whether those notices contained the core elements of
fair information practices.35 In its resulting report to Congress, the
FTC asserted “the most fundamental principle is notice.” 36
Georgetown University and the FTC conducted follow-up sweeps
in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 37 While Congress did not enact
comprehensive federal online privacy legislation as a result of these
findings, online privacy notices nonetheless emerged as a best
practice. However, in 2003 California enacted the California Online
Privacy Protection Act,38 which required operators of commercial
websites that collected personal information from California
residents to post a privacy notice that meets certain requirements.39
Because online businesses typically serve a national audience
34

Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report: Public Workshop on Consumer
Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure (Dec. 1996),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacyglobal-information-infrastructure. The Report also stated that there was general
agreement that in addition to notice, organizations should offer choice, provide
access, secure and maintain the quality of the personal information in their
custody. Id.
35
This research was also described as a “web sweep.” Websites included in the
sample were first reviewed to see if they collected personal information. If it did,
the website was further examined to determine whether it posted a privacy notice,
and if so, whether it mentioned how the website used the information, whether it
offered choice about how this information was used, and if there were any
statements about access or security.
36
Privacy Online: Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 7 (June 1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-reportcongress/priv-23a.pdf.
37
“Self-Regulation and Privacy Online,” FTC Report to Congress, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (July 13, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
1999/07/self-regulation-and-privacy-online-ftc-report-congress; Privacy Online:
Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to Congress,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, 13 (May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketpl
ace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf. In the 2000 sweep, the
FTC found that only 41% of sites in its random sample and 60% of the “Most
Popular Group” met basic standards of notice and choice. Id.
38
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (West 2003).
39
Id.
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independent of where they are based, the California law effectively
imposed a requirement for all U.S. online businesses to post a
privacy notice.40
Both the White House and the FTC revisited notice when they
issued major reports on privacy in 2012.41 The reports discuss notice
in the context of transparency.42 In each report, notice remains the
fundamental mechanism for providing transparency to consumers.43
The White House Report extensively references notice in its
discussion of transparency, highlighting its role, the challenges
faced by organizations providing notice in light of emerging
technology, and the significance of the consumer-company
relationship in determining how notice is provided.44 In its report,
the FTC emphasized greater transparency as one means to advance
its consumer privacy goals.45 It argued for measures that could make
companies’ data practices more transparent, including improved
privacy notices that promote information practices and enable
consumers to compare privacy practices among organizations and
choose among them on that basis.46
In summary, over more than four decades the privacy
discussions in the United States have centered on a common theme:
technology holds the potential to provide enormous benefit to the
economy, firms and individuals, if the privacy concerns raised by
successive generations of technology are addressed. Notice, despite
40

California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, COOLEY ALERT! (June
2004), https://cooley.com/files/ALERT-Cal_OPPA.pdf.
41
Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacyfinal.pdf [hereinafter Consumer Data Privacy]; Protecting Consumer Privacy in
an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (March 1, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumerprivacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[hereinafter Protecting Consumer Privacy].
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Consumer Data Privacy, supra note 41.
45
Protecting Consumer Privacy, supra note 41. The report also highlighted
simplified consumer choice and privacy-by-design. Id.
46
Id.
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its limitations, remains the primary method for promoting awareness
and addressing these privacy concerns. We now discuss the role of
traditional privacy notices, their challenges and limitations.
III. THE ROLES OF TRADITIONAL NOTICE
Since the principles of fair information practices were
articulated in the 1970s, traditional notice has evolved to serve many
functions for individuals, businesses, regulators, advocates, and the
media.
A. Supporting Consumer Privacy Decisions
Perhaps the essential role for notice is to inform individuals’
decisions about the use of their personal information. In theory,
notice supports autonomy by raising awareness and placing
decisions in the hands of the individual.47 As described above, there
is widespread agreement that awareness promotes fairness and is the
first principle of fair information use. Notice provides the basis for
two types of decisions. First, if choice or consent is available, the
information in notices about an organization’s data practices helps
individuals decide whether to engage with the organization or to
allow subsequent uses of their personal information. Second, notices
enable individuals who value privacy to compare the practices of
different organizations and to choose which companies they wish to
do business with based on the firm’s data practices. Privacy notices
then could serve as the basis for a market solution for privacy.
B. Supporting a Market Solution for Privacy
In 1997, the Clinton Administration released A Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce, 48 outlining the Administration’s
strategy for increasing consumer and business confidence in the use
of electronic networks for commerce. 49 After consulting with
industry, consumer groups, and the Internet community, the
Administration issued five principles to guide government support
47

Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012).
48
A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 31.
49
Id.
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for the development of electronic commerce. 50 It made
recommendations about three types of issues where international
agreements are needed to preserve the Internet as a minimallyregulated medium, one in which competition and consumer choice
would shape the marketplace.51
In its discussion of privacy, the Framework 52 notes that the
privacy principles it articulates build on the OECD Guidelines. 53
The Framework focuses on precepts of awareness and choice and
emphasizes that:
[d]isclosure by data-gatherers is designed to simulate market resolution
of privacy concerns by empowering individuals to obtain relevant
knowledge about why information is being collected, what the
information will be used for, what steps will be taken to protect that
information, the consequences of providing or withholding information,
and any rights of redress that they may have. Such disclosure will enable
consumers to make better judgments about the levels of privacy available
and their willingness to participate.54

The Framework further noted that in the interest of fostering
unimpeded flows of data on the Internet, the U.S. would engage its
trading partners in discussions to build support for industrydeveloped solutions to privacy and for market-driven mechanisms
to promote consumer satisfaction about how their data is handled.55

50

See id. The five principles include: 1) The private sector should leave, 2)
Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce, 3) Where
government involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a
predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce,
4) Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet, 5)
Electronic Commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis. Id.
51
Id. at 6. The three issue areas are financial issues related to customs, taxation,
and electronic payments; legal issues including a UCC for e-commerce,
intellectual property, privacy, and security; and market access issues including
information technology, content, and technical standards.
52
Id.
53
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtr
ansborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm.
54
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 31, at 17.
55
Id.; Privacy and Self Regulation in the Information Age, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (1994),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age.
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To realize this vision of a market solution for privacy, in the mid1990s, the Department of Commerce engaged in a concerted effort
to urge companies to post privacy notices.56 Based on the privacy
practices articulated in notices posted across the commercial sector,
individuals could inform themselves, compare notices, and
determine whether or not to do business with a particular company,
or whether to choose to look elsewhere for a good or service. Privacy
could serve as a brand differentiator, arguably attracting individuals
who valued companies that collected, shared, and used data
responsibly.57
The Clinton Administration’s Framework also reinforced the
role of private sector leadership, and that market forces should guide
the development of the Internet. Further, the Internet should not be
subject to unnecessary regulation.58 The Administration emphasized
that even in situations where collective action was called for,
government should encourage industry self-regulation and private
sector leadership wherever possible. 59 It highlighted the need to
support the efforts of private sector organizations to develop
mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet.60
The
National
Telecommunication
and
Information
Administration of the Department of Commerce (“NTIA”)
highlighted this support for self-regulation as a mechanism to
protect privacy and published a compendium of papers authored by
experts in law, economics, and business, which examined the
strengths and limitations of self-regulation as an approach to

56

See, e.g, Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related
Personal Information, US DEPT. OF COM. (October 1995), available at
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
57
Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy,
COLUM. U., http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/priv_self.htm (last
visited Apr. 28, 2016); Privacy and Self-Regulation in an Information Age, supra,
note 54; Hal Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, U. OF CAL. BERKLEY
(Dec. 6, 1996), http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/privacy.
58
Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal
Information, supra note 56.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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protecting personal information.61 In a paper titled “Markets, SelfRegulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of
Personal Information,”62 Peter Swire describes self-regulation as a
governance instrument that encompasses each of the functions of the
three branches of government – legislation, enforcement, and
adjudication. He discusses the work of industry groups to develop
and issue codes for privacy. In some instances, he argues, the
guidelines themselves serve no enforcement function, but are made
available to industry groups, government, and the public.63 But in
others, the codes incorporate enforcement provisions. He further
discusses the role of industry groups in adjudicating complaints and
initiating enforcement actions.64 His paper also lays out the strengths
of self-regulation—its ability to benefit from industry expertise, to
create flexible guidance that keeps pace with industry
developments, and to stave off government regulation that may be
too prescriptive and therefore limit innovation.65
In these early stages, industry-wide codes of conduct (as
opposed to company-specific practices) served as an important tool
in FTC enforcement of the terms of notices. 66 Collective selfregulatory groups arguably are positioned to use market dynamics
to encourage adherence to industry “best practices” on the theory
that no company can afford to be viewed as indifferent to the privacy
concerns of the public.67 Moreover, in contrast to the self-regulatory
efforts of individual companies, self-regulatory groups can adopt
collective mechanisms to investigate and resolve consumer
61

Privacy and Self Regulation in the Information Age, U.S. DEPT. OF COM.
(June 12, 1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-andself-regulation-information-age.
62
See Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in
the Protection of Personal Information, U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (June 12, 1997) 3–
19, available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-andprivacy.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Swire’s analysis also highlights the limitations of the “pro-self-regulation”
argument. See id.
66
CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FED. TRADE COMM’N. PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
175–81 (2016).
67
Id.
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complaints and thus enforce each company’s compliance with a
given industry’s best practices. 68 FTC oversight—in conjunction
with that of state and local authorities—complements such selfregulatory enforcement by providing an independent legal incentive
for each member company, and the group as a whole, to live up to
its promised standard of behavior.
An early example of such a code was developed by the Online
Privacy Alliance (“OPA”). 69 Formed in 1998 as a cross-industry
coalition of more than 80 global companies, 70 the OPA’s stated
mission was “to lead and support self-regulatory initiatives that
create an environment of trust for online privacy.”71 It developed
standards of conduct that were tailored to the online environment
and which required that all members adopt and post a privacy
policy.72 The organization established guidelines for online privacy
notices, a framework for self-regulatory enforcement, and a special
policy concerning collection of information from children. It also
required that its members adhere to the guidelines and policies,
which the organization posted on its website. The OPA’s guidance
focused on notice to consumers; limitations on purposes and onward
transfers; data quality; access to data and correction; security; and
collection of data from children.73 OPA’s comments on its notice
requirements reflected the role of privacy policies in informed
consumer choice and promoting the use of market forces to
encourage good privacy practices.74
68
69

Id.

See
Privacy
Alliance,
ONLINE
PRIVACY
ALLIANCE,
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). The OPA
is no longer active.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
The data privacy standards announced by the Individual Reference Services
Group (“IRSG”)—an association of fourteen major companies in the individual
reference services industry—are another instance of a cross industry effort to
establish standards of conduct as the basis for self-regulation. Individual
Reference Services: A Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 1997),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/individual-reference-services-report-congress. The
individual reference services industry gathers personal information about
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C. Serving as a Basis for Regulation: The Federal Trade
Commission
In theory, notice is an attractive regulatory vehicle for several
reasons. It is based on an assumption that information provides the
basis for better individual decisions when individual preferences
vary. Notices also allow for flexibility in an environment
characterized by a wide variety of business models. A notice regime
is also relatively easy to enforce, as regulators only have to verify
that the description of the practices is accurate. Notices differ from
warnings, as the purpose of warnings is to prevent a high-risk
activity related to health or safety, while the goal of a notice is to
inform decisions.75

individuals from a number of sources, both public (e.g., state driving records) and
private (e.g., credit information) and provides that information for a fee to privacy
parties and the government. Id. To protect the often-sensitive personal data with
which IRSG members deal on a day-to-day basis, the group has adopted binding
standards for the protection of personal information. Id. The IRSG developed
these rules with the advice and participation of the FTC, and the agency endorsed
them as a promising mechanism to “lessen the risk that information made
available through [individual reference] services is misused . . . [and] address
consumers concerns about the privacy of non-public information in the services
databases.” Id.
75
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Discourse, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism
in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012); Archon Fung,
Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of
Transparency, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007.
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act76 empowers the
FTC to investigate and halt any “unfair”77 or “deceptive”78 conduct
in almost all industries affecting interstate commerce. 79 This
authority includes the right to investigate a company’s compliance
with its own asserted data privacy protection policies. Pursuant to
76

15 U.S.C § 45 (2012).
The FTC has articulated three elements of deception as: (1) there must be a
representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) the
act or practice must be considered from the perspective of the reasonable
consumer; and (3) the representation, omission or practice must be material. See
FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Oct. 14, 1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016). In In re Gateway Learning Corp., the FTC alleged
that Gateway committed unfair and deceptive trade practices by making
retroactive changes to its privacy policy without informing customers and by
violating its own privacy policy by selling customer information when it had said
it would not. Gateway Learning Corp., In the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N.
(Dec. 28, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0423047/gateway-learning-corp-matter. Gateway settled the complaint by entering
into a consent decree with the FTC that required it to surrender some profits and
placed restrictions upon Gateway for the following 20 years. Id.
78
Courts have identified three main factors that must be considered in consumer
unfairness cases: (1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether the
practice violates established public policy; and (3) whether it is unethical or
unscrupulous. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972).
The Circuit Courts have concluded that this quotation reflected the Supreme
Court’s own views. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, n.8 (7th Cir. 1976);
see Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974). Since then the Commission
has continued to refine the standard of unfairness in its cases and rules, and it has
now reached a more detailed sense of both the definition and the limits of these
criteria. See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Dec.
17, 1980), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statementunfairness (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
79
In addition to its Section 5 authority, the FTC is delegated broad enforcement
power under a variety of statutes designed to promote fair competition and protect
the interests of consumers. Certain of these statutes—like the Fair Credit
Reporting Act—specifically empower the FTC to investigate and prosecute
violations of U.S. law governing the treatment of specific types of information
relating to an individual’s credit and finances. Others—like the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998—grant the FTC authority to regulate certain data
protection practices and dictate minimum standards for the collection and
distribution of discrete types of personal information (e.g., data relating to
children).
77

536

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 515

Section 5, the FTC may issue cease and desist orders and may also
order other equitable relief, including redress of damages. 80 The
FTC acts under this power to investigate organizations whose
practices do not conform to the policy articulated in the privacy
notice and to provide oversight and enforcement for the U.S. selfregulatory regime in the absence of an omnibus consumer privacy
law.81
1. GeoCities
The first FTC enforcement action against a website operator, the
GeoCities82 case, demonstrated the FTC’s use of Section 5 to require
companies to operate in accordance with their posted information
protection practices. 83 In GeoCities, the FTC challenged the
accuracy of the company’s posted representations about the use of
marketing information collected from individuals registering at the
site.84 The FTC’s complaint also alleged that GeoCities implied that
it operated a website for children but failed to disclose to the
children or their parents that an independent third party operated the
site.85 GeoCities denied the allegations, but established information
policies and procedures in accordance with standards proposed by
the FTC. 86 GeoCities was required to comply with requirements
80

15 U.S.C § 45(a)(2) (2006).
For a comprehensive discussion of the FTC’s role in oversight and
enforcement, see D. Solove and W. Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, (2014) and CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FED.
TRADE COMM’N PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 2016.
82
See GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. August 13, 1998). The full case
materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
982-3015/geocities.
83
Id.
84
GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. February 5, 1999) (Complaint).
85
Id.
86
Under the terms of the consent order, GeoCities agreed to provide clear and
prominent notice to consumers of its information practices, including what
information is collected through its website, the intended uses for that
information, any third parties to whom that information would be disclosed, the
means by which a consumer might access information collected and the means by
which a consumer could have the information removed from the company’s
databases. GeoCities also agreed that it would not misrepresent the identity of any
third party that collected data from a website the company promoted or sponsored.
Finally, GeoCities agreed to contact all consumers from whom it had collected
81
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specified in a consent order.87 In addition, the publicity surrounding
the FTC enforcement action concerning a then-prominent website
operator motivated other companies to post accurate notices and
fulfill the promises made in them.88
2. Toysmart
In a later case, Toysmart.com agreed to settle charges that the
company violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to act in
accordance with representations to consumers that it would never
share their personal information with third parties. 89 When the
company ran into financial problems, it attempted to sell all of its
assets, including detailed personal information about visitors to its
site—name, address, billing information, shopping preferences, and
family profiles, including names and birthdates of children—
contrary to the assertions in the company’s privacy statement.90 On
July 10, 2000, the FTC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts against Toysmart to prevent the sale of
the customer information. 91 The resulting settlement agreement
forbade the sale of this customer information except under very
limited circumstances.92

personal information and afford those individuals an opportunity to have data
removed from the data bases both of the company and any third party. See
GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. February 5, 1999) (Consent Order).
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY
LAW AND POLICY 2016.
89
See Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21,
2000). The full case materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/x000075/toysmartcom-llc-toysmartcom-inc.
90
Toysmart.com, LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21, 2000)
(First Amended Complaint).
91
In re Toysmart.com, LLC, Case No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass.
2000).
92
Under the settlement agreement, Toysmart was allowed only to sell customer
lists as part of a package which included the entire website, and only to an entity
that expressly agreed to abide by the terms of the Toysmart privacy statement and
to follow certain procedures if it wished to change the policy. See Toysmart.com,
LLC, Civil Action No. 00-11341-RGS (F.T.C. July 21, 2000) (Stipulated Consent
Agreement).
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3. Microsoft
In the Microsoft93 case, Microsoft Corporation agreed to settle
Federal Trade Commission charges regarding the assertions it made
about the privacy and security of personal information collected
from consumers through its “Passport” web services. 94 The
Commission initiated its investigation of the Passport services in
response to a complaint filed by a coalition of consumer groups led
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center in July 2001.95
The consent order prohibited any misrepresentation of
information practices in connection with Passport and other similar
services.96 It also required Microsoft to implement and maintain a
comprehensive information security program. 97 In addition,
Microsoft was required to have its security program certified as
meeting or exceeding the standards in the consent order by an
independent professional every two years.98

93

See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. December 24, 2002).
The full case materials are available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/012-3240/microsoft-corporation-matter.
94
The FTC also addressed issues of false representations about security in Eli
Lilly and Company, Docket No. C-4047 (F.T.C. May 10, 2002). The full case
materials
are
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/012-3214/eli-lilly-company-matter.
95
According to the Commission’s complaint, Microsoft made false
representations about (1) the measures it deployed to maintain and protect the
privacy and confidentiality of consumers’ personal information collected through
its Passport and Passport Wallet services; (2) the safety and security of the
purchases made with Passport Wallet compared to purchases made at the same
site without Passport Wallet; (3) the extent to which Passport did or did not collect
personally identifiable information; and (4) the extent to which Passport gave
parents control over information participating Web sites could collect from their
children. See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. December 24,
2002) (Complaint).
96
See Microsoft Corporation, Docket No. C-4069 (F.T.C. August 8, 2002)
(Agreement Containing Consent Order).
97
Id.
98
Id.
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4. Epic Marketplace
In a later case, the FTC entered into a settlement with Epic
Marketplace, 99 an online advertising company, which accessed
users’ browser histories to deliver targeted advertising.100 The FTC
found that Epic’s failure to disclose this practice in its privacy
policies violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.101 The FTC identified a
data activity and a material omission in a privacy policy.102 It alleged
a deceptive practice and entered into an enforcement action. 103
Unlike in previous cases, in which the FTC’s enforcement focused
on affirmatively inaccurate or false statements as deceptive—for
example, in the Upromise case104—the Epic case signaled the FTC’s
inclination to find an organizations’ inadequate disclosure about its
data practices in itself to be inherently deceptive.105
According to the FTC complaint, Epic engaged in online
behavioral advertising by tracking consumers’ online activities to
deliver targeted advertising specific to each user’s interests, as
identified based on their browsing history. 106 Epic asserted in its
posted policy that it was merely tracking user visits to sites on Epic’s
network. 107 In practice, however, Epic obtained users’ browsing
histories from their browsers in order to deliver advertisements.108
Epic observed browsing histories to learn about users’ interest in
sensitive financial and medical topics such as debt relief, personal
99

See Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013).
The full case materials are available at: https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/112-3182/epic-marketplace-inc.
100
Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013)
(Decision and Order).
101
Epic Marketplace, Inc., Docket No. C-4389 (F.T.C. March 13, 2013)
(Complaint).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
The FTC alleged that Upromise’s practice of using a web-browser toolbar
to collect consumers’ personal information without adequately disclosing the
extent of the information it is collecting is deceptive. See Upromise, Inc., Docket
No. C-4351 (F.T.C. March 27, 2012). The full case materials are available at
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3116/upromise-inc.
105
See supra note 99.
106
See supra note 101.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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bankruptcy, incontinence, and fertility.109 Epic’s tracking practices
involved not only monitoring Epic’s network, but also gathering
data from other sites as well, despite the claims to the contrary in the
company’s privacy policy.
D. Informing the Public Dialogue about Data Use and Protection
An organization’s posted notices make its data and privacy
practices public. Notices enable non-governmental organizations,
advocates, and the press to monitor an individual company’s activity
with respect to data. Taken together, the notices posted by
companies provide a window into the evolution of data-gathering
technology and data practices across industry. In doing so, privacy
notices and the information they make available foster a public
conversation about data collection and use, and make possible a role
for the public in the debate about how data is used and protected. In
some instances,110 privacy watchdogs, advocacy organizations, and
interested individuals have discovered discrepancies in privacy
notices or have tested a company’s practices against the assertions
in their notice and then brought their findings to the press and
regulators.111
The complaint against Facebook brought before the FTC by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) in 2010 provides
one example.112 EPIC alleged business practices it believed to be
unfair and deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act, including
Facebook’s disclosure of users’ personal information to its partners
without first obtaining users’ consent, its disclosure of personal
information to which users previously restricted access, and its
disclosure of the information to the public when users elected to
make that information available to friends only.113 Central to EPIC’s
complaint was a detailed review of the representations in
109

Id.
Id.
111
Id.
112
In re Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, (F.T.C. 2012), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc.
(The web site includes all the materials for the case).
113
Epic Complaint to F.T.C. (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
https://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf.
110
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Facebook’s posted privacy policy and a comparison of those
assertions against what EPIC asserted were actual information
practices.114 This complaint led the FTC to issue a consent decree
with Facebook that bars Facebook from making deceptive privacy
claims, requires that the company obtain consumers’ approval
before it changes the way it shares their data, and requires that its
privacy practices undergo periodic assessment by independent,
third-party auditors for the ensuing 20 years.115
E. Providing an Opportunity for Internal Review of Data
Practices
The development and articulation of an accurate, current privacy
notice requires considerable effort on the part of companies. To
write a clear, comprehensive notice requires an understanding of the
types of data the organization collects; the points and methods of
collection; how data is used and with whom it is shared; where and
how it is stored and how long it is kept; and how it is secured and
protected from loss, wrongful access, or inappropriate use. It also
requires that companies understand the data protection and privacy
rules and laws that apply.
In conducting the inventory necessary to understand the
company’s data practices, organizations are given the opportunity to
ask questions and make decisions about data. What do I collect? Do
I need to collect it to carry out a particular function? With whom do
I share data? Do I trust that third party to use data responsibly? How
is the data secured? Have the circumstances of storage and the

114

For example, Facebook has represented, expressly or by implication that,
through their Profile Privacy Settings, users can restrict access to their profile
information to specific groups, such as “Only Friends” or “Friends of Friends.” In
truth and in fact, in many instances, users could not restrict access to their profile
information to specific groups, such as “Only Friends” or “Friends of Friends”
through their Profile Privacy Settings. Instead, such information could be
accessed by Platform Applications that their Friends used. See In re Facebook,
Inc.,
No.
C-4365,
(F.T.C.
2012)
(Complaint),
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc.
115
In re Facebook, Inc., File No. 092 3184, (F.T.C. 2011) (Agreement
Containing Consent Order), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf.
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threats of data intrusion changed since these security practices were
last reviewed?
While not originally envisioned to function in this way, the
drafting of a privacy notice provides a company with an opportunity
to inventory and assess internal practices, making sure they are up
to date, necessary, and appropriate. It can also serve as a platform
for decision-making about whether to continue with a data practice
or deployment of technology in light of considerations related to
brand, and developments in law, policy, or market practices.
However, it provides the added benefit of helping companies
keep abreast of data collection and use across the organization, stay
aware of the privacy impact and potential risk of data use, and make
reasoned decisions about appropriate data use and protection.116
IV.
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT NOTICES
Critics of notice often argue that notices are of limited utility.117
They assert notices are not useful because they are not drafted in a
way that makes them useful to individuals; they also argue that
because meaningful choice is rarely available to individuals, notice
is no longer needed to inform individual choice. This Section
addresses these arguments.
A. Notices are often found to be complex, unclear, and too lengthy
to be useful to consumers or to support meaningful choice.
In the United States no omnibus federal law requires
organizations to post notices. As a result, companies post notices to
comply with state laws such as the California Online Privacy
Protection Act of 2003118 or they post notices voluntarily. The FTC
generally has not articulated requirements about format, length,
116

See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1060 (2012).
117
FRED H. CATE, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY 360–63 (Jane K. Winn, 2006).
118
The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 22575-22579 (2004), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=BPC&division=8.&title=&part=&chapter=
22.&article=.
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readability, or content of a given privacy notice. 119 As discussed
above, the FTC brings actions based on unfair or deceptive practices
to hold companies to whatever assertions they make in their posted
policy.120 Thus, even if law does not require a company to post a
notice, once a company does post a notice, it is subject to
enforcement of its terms. Because a company potentially incurs
liability by posting a notice, corporate counsel offices are
understandably motivated to limit legal exposure and draft notices
that are lengthy and legalistic. 121 As a result, notices lack the
attributes needed to provide consumers with what they need to know
about an organization’s data and privacy practices. Moreover,
notices were originally intended to facilitate a one-on-one
relationship between individuals and websites. Today, the complex
technologies, business models and data practices, and networks of
vendor relationships that support digital services (e.g., Internet of
Things, cloud computing, big data, behavioral advertising) are
difficult to explain and challenge attempts to draft simple, readable
notices. It has been suggested that even if at a given moment a notice
could reasonably describe an organization’s information flows and
data protection measures, the rapid change in technology, analytics,
and business relationships can quickly render it inaccurate.122
To make traditional privacy notices useful to individuals,
drafters face the challenge of communicating large amounts of
complex, often technical information in a succinct, reader-friendly
way. The notices that result often are hard to read (and even more
difficult to understand), read infrequently, and do not support

119

One exception is the GLB model form that specified content and format for
GLB privacy notices. See infra Part V.C.1.
120
See supra Part III.C.
121
For example, one longitudinal study hypothesized that concerns about FTC
enforcement actions resulted in a decrease in readability of privacy notices from
2001 to 2003. See George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan and Henry Greene, A
Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 26 J. OF PUB.
POL’Y AND MKTG., 238, 249 (2006).
122
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS,
32, 36 (2011).
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rational decision making about privacy.123 Because individuals have
limited ability to process information, traditional notices often result
in information overload and do not promote informed decisions.124
Researchers estimate that the time alone invested in reading the
privacy notices for the websites an individual visits on average in a
given year is approximately 201 hours per year per person,
representing a total national opportunity cost of $781 billion. 125
Further, privacy notices are only one type of disclosure that
individuals encounter in a typical day, resulting in what Ben-Shahar
and Schneider describe as the “accumulation problem” where
people encounter too many disclosures overall to digest the majority
of them.126
Whether a notice is clear or not depends upon whether the target
audience reasonably can be expected to be able to read and
comprehend it. Research has revealed significant readability issues
with current privacy notices. 127 For example, Jensen and Potts
measured readability for online privacy notices for 47 high-traffic
Web sites and found that on average, these notices had a grade-level
readability score of 14.2—two years past high school.128 Milne and
his colleagues conducted a longitudinal assessment of the
readability of privacy notices of 321 top Web sites based on
unduplicated visitors.129 The initial grade-level readability score was
123

See, e.g., George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies of Reducing Online
Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18
J. OF INTERACTIVE MKTG., 15, 29 (2004).
124
See Calo, supra note 116.
125
Alecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, I/S, A J. OF L. AND POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y, (2008), available at
http://www.is-journal.org.
126
Omar Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosures, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 705–08 (2011) (providing an interesting
illustration of the accumulation problem).
127
Carlin Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy Policies as Decision-Making Tools:
An Evaluation of Online Privacy Notices, 6 CHI LETTERS 471, 478, (2004).
128
Jensen and Potts reviewed 64 privacy policies, analyzing among other things
their accessibility. They attributed ease of use to how easily it is for consumers to
locate the policy, a function of where the link is placed and how visible it is to
users. Id.
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Milne et al., supra note 121.
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11.2—equivalent to some high school.130 Two years later, the grade
level increased to 12.3 and 58 percent of the notices had increased
in length.131 Both studies criticized existing notices for being written
at an educational level exceeding that of a large proportion of the
population. In a survey of 119 participants, Acquisiti and Grossklags
found that 41 percent read privacy policies only rarely, even after
expressing a high degree of concern about privacy.132 Further, recent
studies also found that a majority of the public incorrectly assumes
that the existence of a privacy policy necessarily means that the firm
will protect the confidentiality of all their personal information. 133
A notice’s usefulness also depends in part on whether or not an
individual can easily locate it. When privacy notices are difficult to
access – obscured by their location or posted in lettering that blends
with other text – they provide little help to individuals attempting to
understand data practices or choose whether or not to engage with a
company or use a device or service.
The FTC addressed this issue in 2009, when it entered into a
consent decree with Sears Holding Management Corporation.134 The
FTC enforcement action began after Sears disseminated a
“research” software application for consumers to download and
install on their home computers in connection with the “My SHC
Community” program.135 According to the FTC, Sears represented
to consumers that this software application, if downloaded and

130

Id.
Id.
132
Alessandor Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in
Individual Decision Making, JAN./FEB. IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 24, 30,
(2005).
133
See Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy
Policy Is, FACT TANK, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know
-what-a-privacy-policy-is/; Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, The
Tradeoff Fallacy, ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC’N., UNIV. OF PENN, (June 2015),
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf.
134
In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management, Docket No. C-4264 (2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-3099/sears-holdingsmanagement-corporation-corporation-matter.
135
Id.
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installed, would track consumers’ “online browsing” activities. 136
The FTC alleged that Sears failed to disclose to consumers that the
application would (i) track nearly all of the consumers’ online
behavior (including information provided in secure sessions with
third-party websites, shopping carts and online accounts), (ii) track
certain offline activity on the computer, and (iii) transmit most of
the tracked information to Sears’ remote computer servers.137 In its
complaint, the FTC argued that these facts would be material to
consumers when deciding whether to install the software, and Sears’
failure to disclose the information constituted a deception in
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.138 The FTC acknowledged the
application “functioned and transmitted information substantially as
described in the [Privacy Statement and User License Agreement],”
but noted that this disclosure was available only in the lengthy
agreement provided near the end of the multi-step registration
process.139
B. Choice is increasingly less meaningful, appropriate and/or
available to the consumer, raising the question of why notice is
relevant or necessary at all.
In the fair information practices principles, choice was
articulated to allow individuals to limit secondary use when personal
information was collected for one purpose and used for other
purposes. 140 In practice, choice is offered for a limited set of
practices: individuals can opt-out of unwanted marketing email or
targeted advertising based on their online browsing behavior, but not
the receipt of online advertising in general.141
136

Id.
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
The principle of use limitation is found in the principles of fair information
practices as articulated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. See Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtr
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CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 178 (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
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Further, as data sharing and processing drives more and more of
society’s most essential functions, individual choice about the
collection, processing, and secondary uses of data has become more
circumscribed. Use of data for socially valuable purposes, e.g., law
enforcement, locating lost children, tracking deadbeat parents,
medical research, fraud detection, and network security argue
against restricting collection and use of certain kinds of data on the
basis of choice.
In the emerging data eco-system, characterized by sensor-rich
environments, complex vendor relationships and analytic
processing of big data, the ability of individuals to consent to any
particular instance of data collection or use may be vastly more
limited than it was in the era when data was collected almost
exclusively through websites, and where the individual interacted
with a single entity, typically the web publisher. Given this
diminished role of consent, some commenters question whether
notice remains relevant at all.142
V. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF NOTICE
Attempts to address the challenges of informing the individual
and the limitations of traditional privacy notices have taken two
forms: (1) efforts to improve written privacy notices - both offline
notices distributed on paper and online privacy notices and (2)
efforts to create alternatives to written notices.
142

Cate, supra note 117. Cate argues that a system of data protection based on
consumer choice no longer works and that notices provide individuals only with
an “illusion of enhanced privacy.” He describes the proliferation of notices that
are rarely read and little understood by individuals and asserts that they serve as
a formality rather than a mechanism that promotes transparency or informs
individual choice. He highlights in particular that in many cases, services cannot
be offered subject to individual choice because to make choice available would
run contrary to other societal interests. Cate proposes an approach that would
require notice only where collection of data is not reasonably obvious to the
individual. In contrast to Cate’s view, we believe that even when not used or acted
upon by consumers, traditional notices remain essential to transparency, serving
the functions we describe elsewhere in this paper – the basis for enforcement, the
support for public awareness and action through the activity of the press and
advocacy community, and the opportunity for internal review of data collection,
processing and protection practices.
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A. Efforts to Improve Written Privacy Notices
In 2001, the FTC and the Centre for Information Policy
Leadership (“CIPL”) undertook projects to develop a standard
format for short or layered notices.143 In 2014, NTIA moderated a
multi-stakeholder process to develop transparency guidelines for
mobile apps. Both are reviewed below.144
Early attempts to design short or layered notices were a response
to the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 145
(“GLBA”). GLBA requires that financial institutions issue privacy
notices to their customers,146 and specifies the content - but not the
format - of the notice. In December 2001, the eight GLB agencies
convened a joint public workshop titled “Get Noticed” to examine
the challenges of providing effective notice and to identify strategies
for improving the readability of notices required by GLBA. 147
Subsequently, the Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 148 directed the
GLB agencies jointly to develop a model form that companies could
use to issue their GLBA privacy notices. The agencies released a
model form in March 2007.149 The final rule, issued in the Federal
143

See Centre for Information Policy Leadership, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP,
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/projects_archives/ (last visited Apr.
26, 2016).
144
See Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application Transparency,
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TELECOMM.
&
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(Nov.
12,
2013),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholderprocess-mobile-application-transparency.
145
Pub L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999.
146
Because of the broad scope of GLBA, eight federal agencies were
responsible for developing compliance standards and subsequently enforcing
GLBA. They are: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Office of the Controller of the Currency, Office of Thrift
Supervision, the FDIC, the SEC, and National Credit Union Administration and
the FTC.
147
See Get Noticed: Effective Financial Privacy Notices, FED. TRADE COMM’N.
(Dec.
4,
2001),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_events/interagency-public-workshop-get-noticed-effective-financialprivacy-notices/glbtranscripts.pdf.
148
Pub. L. 109-351, October 13, 2006.
149
See Final Model Privacy Form Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - 16 CFR
Part 313, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/ federalregister-notices/final-model-privacy-form-under-gramm-leach-bliley-act-16-cfr-part.
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Register on December 1, 2009,150 specified the content and format
for institutions choosing to adopt the standardized GLBA notice.151
Also in 2001, the Centre for Information Policy Leadership at
the law firm of Hunton and Williams LLP undertook a project to
develop a multi-layered online privacy notice that would
complement an organization’s existing “long” privacy notice.152 The
goal of the project was to provide a standard, simplified format that
would promote better consumer decisions about whether or not to
share personal information with a particular organization. 153 The
simplified format was expected to communicate effectively with
individuals about how an organization collects, uses, shares, and
protects personal information; individuals wishing more detail about
the organization’s practices could also consult the long notice.154 In
November 2004, the EU Article 29 Working Party155 endorsed the

150

For a copy of the final rule, see FEDERAL REGISTER, FINAL MODEL PRIVACY
FORM UNDER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT; FINAL RULE (2001),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/finalmodel-privacy-form-under-gramm-leach-bliley-act-16-cfr-part313/091201gramm-leach.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
151
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PRIVACY
MODEL
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https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/rules/privacy-consumer-financialinformation-financial-privacy-rule/privacymodelform_optout.pdf (last visited
April 18, 2016). The model form consists of two pages and is formatted as a table
with sections for information collection and use, information sharing, how to opt
out of information sharing (if relevant), definitions of affiliates and joint of
marketing, and other information the institution wishes to provide.
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(Feb.
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Apr. 26, 2016).
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concept of a multi-layered notice. 156 At least two organizations
currently use the layered notice.157
A third effort to improve written notices began in summer 2012
when the NTIA launched a multi-stakeholder process to address
how to provide notices for mobile apps. 158 The White House
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights called for the use of a multistakeholder process to develop voluntary, enforceable codes of
conduct to address privacy questions raised by new technologies and
specific data practices; this was the first such process.159 The multistakeholder group agreed to limit the scope of its work to developing
a code of conduct for a short form notice for mobile devices.160 On
156

The EU recommendation called for two layers in addition to the long notice.
Layer 1 of the short notice was to include the identity and contact details for the
data controller, and the purpose for processing. Layer 1 was to be used when space
was very limited. Layer 2 of the condensed notice was to provide six items in less
than a page with subheadings: scope, personal information collected, uses and
sharing, choices (including any access options), important information, and
contact information. The content of the “important information” section, as well
as the wording and format of the condensed notice, was left to the organization.
See Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, ARTICLE 29
DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY (Nov. 25, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp100_en.pdf.
157
See, e.g., Privacy Policy Highlights, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (2016),
http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/privacy-policy/privacy-policy-highlights.htm;
P&G Privacy Notice, PROCTER & GAMBLE (2016), http://www.pg.com/privacy/
english/privacy_notice.shtml.
158
See First Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE:
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMINISTRATION (July 12, 2012),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2012/first-privacy-multistakeholdermeeting-july-12-2012.
159
Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 23, 2012), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/privacy-final.pdf. For more information about the multi-stakeholder
process itself, see Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application
Transparency, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMINISTRATION
(Nov.
12,
2013),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/otherpublication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-process-mobile-application-transparency.
160
See Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting: Mobile Application Transparency,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMINISTRATION (Oct.
16,
2012),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/10162012_
agenda_revised.pdf.
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July 25, 2013, the Department of Commerce released a draft of the
code, which specified the data categories to be included in the
notice. 161 It also required adopters to describe the types of data
collected, how user-specific data is shared, where an individual can
access a long form privacy notice if one exists, and the identity of
the entity providing the app. The draft code includes design
guidelines for the notice. 162 The multi-stakeholder group has not
been active since the draft code was issued in 2013.163
The GLB model form was subjected to quantitative consumer
testing, which assessed the performance of the final notice.164 While
focus groups were used in the design of the CIPL layered notice,
neither the CIPL notice nor the NTIA notice for mobile applications
were subject to quantitative performance testing.165
Carnegie Mellon researchers tested the mobile applications
notice generated by the NTIA process. They found that many users

161

See Short Form Notice Code of Conduct to Promote Transparency in Mobile
App Practices, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE: NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMINISTRATION (July 25, 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/july_25_code_draft.pdf.
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Id.
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164
See Alan Levy & Manoj Hastak, Consumer Comprehension of Financial
Privacy Notices (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/
privacyinitiatives/Levy-Hastak-Report.pdf (describing how the GLB model form
was tested for consumer comprehension).
165
Typically, two types of research inform the design of new disclosures.
Qualitative research (e.g. focus groups) is used to design initial prototypes.
Quantitative research is used to test prototypes to see which performs best in
meeting the objectives of the new disclosure. Quantitative testing is important
because ad hoc theories about what works best are not always reliable and must
be validated against objective criteria. For example, the FTC conducted both
qualitative and quantitative research to design the GLB model form. In the
quantitative research, the researchers engaged by the FTC tested three alternative
notices using a sample of 1032 individuals from five different geographical areas.
The testing assessed the alternatives on their ability to help consumers (a)
compare across banks based on the banks’ information practices, (b) evaluate
available “opt-out” choices, and (c) make informed choices across banks. See id.;
see also Alan S. Levy, Sara B. Fein & Raymond E. Schucker, Performance
Characteristics of Seven Nutrition Label Formats, 15 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 1, 1–15 (1996).
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had limited understanding of the terms used in the NITA notice.166
In another study, Carnegie Mellon researchers tested traditional
privacy notices and layered notices.167 They found that consumers
processed information articulated in layered notices faster than that
found in long notices, but that readers of the layered notices came
away with a less accurate sense of an organization’s data and privacy
practices.168 They also found that people did not choose to continue
to read the long notice when they did not find the information they
sought in the short notice.169 This suggests that testing should be an
integral part of the design of alternative notices if the alternatives
are to be useful.
B. Alternatives to Traditional Notice
This section describes three efforts to develop alternatives to
traditional privacy notices. The Platform for Privacy Preferences
(“P3P”) represents the most ambitious attempt to date to use
technology to improve online disclosures. The AdChoices “icon”
provides a way to provide better visibility for online behavioral
advertising. Finally, some organizations have independently begun
to develop tools to help inform their users.
1. The Platform for Privacy Preferences
P3P is a standard developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (“W3C”) through a multi-year process that began in
1997. 170 A final Last Call specification was issued in September

166

See Rebecca Balebako, Richard Shay & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Is Your Inseam
a Biometric? A Case Study on the Role of Usability Studies in Developing Public
Policy, (Feb. 2014), available at http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/usec14-inseam.pdf.
167
See generally Alecia M. McDonald et. al., A Comparative Study of Online
Privacy Policies and Formats, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: 9TH
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, PETS 2009, SEATTLE, WA, USA, AUGUST 5–7,
2009. PROCEEDINGS 37–55 (Ian Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009).
168
See id.
169
See id.
170
LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, WEB PRIVACY WITH P3P 46 (O’Reilly &
Associates, eds., 2002) (Chapter 4 describes the history of P3P).

MAY 2016] From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency

553

2001.171 Adoption of P3P was voluntary.172 P3P provides a syntax
with which websites can code the privacy practices described in
their traditional privacy notice.173 Using a standard XML format, the
notice can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user
agents such as browsers or other applications.174 These user agents
allow online users to learn about the information practices of the
sites they visit without needing to read the written privacy notice.175
Many perceived P3P as too difficult and complicated to use, and
it never was widely implemented.176 Microsoft was the only major
browser to support P3P; Internet Explorer 6 (“IE6”) used P3P to
implement cookie filtering.177 Using a slider, individuals set their
privacy preferences in IE6 along a spectrum ranging from high to
low. If IE6 found a P3P policy, it evaluated the website’s privacy
practices as described in its P3P policy and decided, based on the set
preference, which cookies were acceptable. IE6 could, for example,
accept a cookie, accept a cookie but downgrade it to a session
cookie, or suppress or reject a cookie entirely.

171

See generally id. For a copy of the most recent P3P specification and other
documents related to the development of P3P, see Lorie Cranor & Rigo Wenning,
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project: Enabling smarter Privacy Tools
for the Web, W3: PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.w3.org/P3P/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2007).
172
See Cranor, supra note 170, at 55.
173
See Cranor & Wenning, supra note 171.
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175
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176
An internal Citibank white paper argued that implementing P3P could also
limit a company in terms of the commerce, cross-selling, and marketing
information collected online. The authors state that the paper it is simply a
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official position of Citibank. See generally Kenneth Lee and Gabriel Speyer,
White paper: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) & Citibank, CITIBANK
ADVANCED
DEV.
GRP.
(Oct.
22,
1998),
available
at
http://www.w3.org/P3P/Lee_Speyer.html.
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Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Windows CE 5.0) contains a
description of Microsoft’s implementation of P3P for cookie filtering. Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Windows CE 5.0), MICROSOFT
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms905230.aspx (last visited Apr. 14,
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Two standalone applications also implemented P3P: Privacy
Bird and Privacy Finder.178 Privacy Bird automatically searches for
P3P privacy policies at every website a user visits.179 The Privacy
Bird software asks the user to describe their privacy concerns; it then
communicates to the user whether a visited site’s policies match
their stated privacy preferences. 180 The software displays a green
bird icon at websites that match, and a red bird icon at sites that do
not.181 If the software cannot find or fetch a P3P policy from the
visited website, the Privacy Bird displays a yellow icon.182
Privacy Finder is a privacy-enhanced search engine that delivers
search results based on websites’ computer-readable privacy
policies.183 A privacy meter with green boxes indicates how closely
the website’s privacy policy matches a list of preset privacy
preferences. If no privacy meter is displayed, it means that a valid
P3P policy could not be located for a given website.184
2. AdChoices Icon
The research projects described above were early attempts to
better inform the individual in an environment where website
content was provided by a single source, typically the site owner.
Today, a web page is likely to be supported by many vendors and
comprise content from many different sources, each of which may
follow different information practices. In February 2009, the FTC
issued a staff report articulating self-regulatory principles that
applied to online advertising where ads were targeted based on
178

PRIVACY BIRD, http://www.privacybird.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016);
PRIVACY FINDER, http://www.privacyfinder.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
179
Lorrie Faith Cranor, Praveen Guduru & Manjula Arjula, User Interfaces for
Privacy Agents, 13 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERACTION
135, 135–78 (2006).
180
Id. at 136–39.
181
Id. at 148, 155.
182
Id. at 155.
183
PRIVACY FINDER, supra note 178.
184
Privacy Bird was originally developed by AT&T Corp. See PRIVACY BIRD,
http://www.privacybird.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). Both applications are
currently maintained by the CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Lab at Carnegie
Mellon University. See CYLAB, http://cups.cs.cmu.edu (last visited Apr. 14,
2016).
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tracking individuals over time. 185 The principles excluded
contextual advertising where an ad was based on a single visit to a
web page or a single search request and “first party” advertising
where data was not shared with third parties.
In response to the FTC report, the online advertising industry
formed the Digital Advertising Alliance (“DAA”) – an alliance to
promote implementation of the FTC principles and to create a
clickable icon, which would appear on online ads.186 The AdChoices
Icon represents an attempt to provide greater awareness in an
environment where networks of online advertisers track browsing
behavior across websites.187
Stakeholders hoped that over time, the icon would become as
recognizable to consumers as the recycling symbol.188 Currently, the
program applies to online behavioral advertising for both the
desktop and mobile environments and includes a webpage that
individuals can visit to opt out of receiving advertising that has been
targeted based on their browsing behavior.189

185

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Self-Regulatory Principles For Online
Behavioral Advertising (2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatoryprinciples-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf.
186
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The desktop version was launched in 2011 and the mobile version was
launched in 2015. For an example of the icon, visit http://www.yahoo.com. When
a user clicks on the icon, a notice “Why this Ad?” is displayed. Why this Ad?,
YAHOO, https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/relevantads.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2016).
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(Jan.
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2010)
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The DAA program appears to have been widely adopted;
however researchers found instances of non-compliance.190 Further,
the effectiveness of the program has not been extensively assessed,
and there is no indication that usability testing was conducted as part
of the AdChoices design process.191 Researchers at Carnegie Mellon
University independently assessed Internet users’ perceptions of
disclosures about online behavioral advertising.192 Drawing on prior
research, they tested icons, taglines, and landing pages and found
that all fell short in terms of notifying study participants about online
behavioral advertising and clearly informing them about their
choices.193
3. Company-generated Tools
Organizations have taken independent steps to create tools by
which consumers can view and control their personal information.
For example, the Google privacy policy includes a section on
“Transparency and Choice,” which describes tools generated by
Google that allow users to access their account history, view and
edit their preferences about the Google ads they receive, and control
who people share their information with through their Google
Account.194 Acxiom, a large data broker, offers “About the Data,” a
tool to help consumers learn about the data Acxiom has collected
about them.195
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Advertising Notice and Choice Requirements, CARNEGIE MELLON CYLAB, (2011),
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193
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the meaning of opt out, and 5) user education is needed.
194
Welcome to Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE PRIVACY AND TERMS,
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/?fg=1 (last visited April 14, 2016).
195
ABOUTTHEDATA.COM, https://www.aboutthedata.com/ (last visited April
14, 2016).
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C. Lessons Learned and Unresolved Challenges
While it is widely acknowledged that most traditional privacy
notices are too long, lack uniformity, and are difficult to
comprehend, notice is still viewed as the primary means whereby
organizations make the public aware of their data practices.196 The
efforts to improve notices described above yielded mixed results.
For example, only two of these efforts, the AdChoices icon and the
GLB model form, were widely adopted. 197 Nonetheless, these
efforts, particularly the GLB model form, provide useful insights
about what enhances or inhibits the ability to provide more effective
notices.
1. Lessons of the GLB Model Form
Legislation and implementing rules offer organizations
incentives to adopt the GLB model form. GLBA requires that
covered organizations disseminate privacy notices that meet criteria
established in the law’s disclosure requirements and the privacy rule
implementing the law.198 While the use of the model privacy form is
voluntary, organizations that do so benefit from certainty that they
satisfy these criteria. Moreover, the standardized format and content
of the model form creates efficiencies for consumers by better
196

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, FTC
Report (Mar. 2012) https://www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacyera-rapid-change-recommendations-businesses-policymakers;
THE
WHITE
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
DIGITAL ECONOMY, (Feb. 2012) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/privacy-final.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION
DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (Feb. 27, 2015)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-actof-2015-discussion-draft.pdf.
197
See, e.g, Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., Are They Actually Any Different?
Comparing Thousands of Financial Institutions’ Privacy Policies, WEIS, (2013)
http://weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/CranorWEIS2013.pdf;
Digital
Advertising Alliance (DAA) Announces “Your AdChoices” Consumer Education
Campaign, 4A’s (Jan. 20, 2012) http://www.aaaa.org/news/press/Pages/
012012_daa_adchoices.aspx.
198
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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enabling choice about information use (to the extent available under
the law) and allowing consumers to compare choices across
financial institutions. Finally, the notice as articulated in the model
form continues to provide a basis for FTC regulation.
Moreover, because the GLBA implementing rule does not
provide the assurances of a safe harbor,199 some companies perceive
that posting a notice in a way other than that prescribed by the model
form increases their risk of exposure to an FTC enforcement action.
The model’s clear rules for content and format arguably lessen that
exposure. Finally, rigorous consumer testing increased the
probability that the form would be effective.
In 2013, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University assessed
over 3,000 GLBA policies based on data collected using an
automated web crawler.200 The study highlighted the challenges that
organizations using the form face when disclosing what types of
information they collect.201 Restrictions on what language may be
used to describe how information is collected also posed
problems. 202 While standardized language facilitated transparency
and comparisons across institutions, the researchers found some of
the terms used were redundant or ambiguous. 203 However, when
researchers compared privacy practices across similar institutions,
they found differences in their privacy practices, suggesting that
making a company’s data practices more conspicuous could
empower consumers’ decision-making. 204 The standardized table
format used in the GLB model form thus appears to hold promise
for a better way to deliver necessary information about data and
privacy practices to individuals.

199

The implementing rule originally provided safe harbor protection for
organizations using the model form. The final rule eliminated the safe harbor.
200
Lorrie Faith Cranor et. al., Are They Actually Any Different? Comparing
Thousands of Financial Institutions’ Privacy Policies, WEIS (2013)
http://weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/CranorWEIS2013.pdf.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.

MAY 2016] From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency

559

2. Promise and Challenges of a “Nutrition Label” Format for
Privacy Notices
The CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Lab (“CUPS Lab”)205
at Carnegie Mellon University researches, develops, and tests
alternatives to traditional privacy notices. 206 In a recent study,
researchers tested four alternative forms of privacy notices,
comparing them to natural language, full-text policies. 207 They
found that of the five options, the standardized table yielded the best
results.208 They concluded that the success of this approach resulted
from both the table format and the standardized language.209 Both
the format and the language improved accuracy, the ability to locate
information, the speed with which an individual could locate
information, and the individual’s experience in reading notices.210
These findings argued for developing a format for short privacy
notices similar to nutritional labels.211
Despite their promise, developing a privacy notice modeled after
food nutrition labels poses significant challenges. The nutrition
content of food can be analyzed and quantified, and the numerical
values posted on the labels can be objectively tested and verified by
a third party. The result is a set of reliable numbers the consumer
can compare easily. A consumer interested in purchasing, for
example, a loaf of bread can quickly compare several brands based
205

CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory, CARNEGIE MELLON
CYLAB., http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/.
206
See id.
207
Patrick Gage Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study
of the Nutrition Label Approach, CARNEGIE MELLON CYLAB. (Jan. 12, 2010),
https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf. For
further CUPS research on this topic, see Privacy Nutrition Labels, CARNEGIE
MELLON CYLAB, http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/privacyLabel/.
208
Kelley et al., supra note 207. The four alternatives evaluated in addition to
a natural language notice include: (1) the standardized table, a variant of the
nutrition label; (2) the standardized short table (an abbreviated version of the
standardized table, minus categories of data the organization does not collect); (3)
the standardized short text, which translates the standardized short form table into
English statements; and (4) the layered text, an approach adapted from the CIPL
layered notice described above. Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
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on calories per serving and cholesterol, vitamin, fat, and fiber
content. In the United States, they can also use the label to compare
products against numerically expressed government nutrition
recommendations. These values are unlikely to change quickly, and
if they do, their accuracy can be readily tested in a lab. Creating an
accurate nutritional label involves simply filling in the boxes on the
form. As a result, the nutrition label has been at least moderately
effective at promoting consumer choice, creating a basis for
regulation, and providing a source of information for consumer
advocates and the media.212
While the effectiveness of both nutrition labels and privacy
notices depends on consumers’ ability to understand the information
disclosed in the notice, privacy notices pose challenges not faced by
entities adopting the nutrition label format. First, data practices and
protections do not lend themselves to quantified expression. For
example, while nutrition labels are based on “percent of
Recommended Daily Allowance,” there is no comparable standard
for information practices given the variety of business models and
industries. Moreover, for food, the product is fixed at purchase and
the individual controls its use after purchase. For information, the
individual currently has little comparable control as the company
controls future uses of the data. All future uses are unlikely to be
known at the time of disclosure and may be subject to change. This,
and the fact that personal information touches many entities within
an organization, challenges attempts to accurately describe the
organization’s data practices.
C. Looking Ahead
In its 2012 report, FTC proposed that to promote better
comprehension and comparison of privacy practices, notices should
be “clearer, shorter, and more standardized.”213 It recognized that a
rigid format for use across all sectors is not appropriate, and that it
would be necessary to accommodate differences in business models
212

See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) at 84–85. See also SUSAN
G. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL (1986) at 145-151.
213
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, supra note 41, at
61.
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across industry sectors. 214 It stated that to allow individuals to
compare privacy practices across companies and encourage
companies to compete on privacy, privacy notices should contain
some standardized elements such as terminology and format.215 How
this would work in practice remains an open question. Further, the
time required by efforts aimed at improving notices described
previously suggest that creating new forms of effective notice is a
long-term project and that these efforts are unlikely to be successful
unless consumer testing is part of the design process. New
technologies such as mobile applications and the “Internet of
Things” pose further challenges to notice.
VI.
EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The prior sections focused primarily on issues related to
providing notice in traditional computing on desktops and laptops.
This Section reviews the challenges raised by new technologies and
data ecosystems, which may provide little opportunity to interface
with the consumer. This limited opportunity for interaction with the
consumer makes providing notice difficult and sometimes
impossible.
The broad implementation of notices starting in the 1990’s
began in a data environment that centered primarily on the collection
of data via websites.216 Privacy protections were based on a theory
of control – individuals who were made aware of data practices and
protection measures and provided the opportunity to choose based
on assertions in a posted privacy policy could make decisions about
the collection and use and sharing of data pertaining to them.217
Increasingly, individuals will navigate spaces throughout which
data is collected, shared, and processed silently and ubiquitously—
and for a wide variety of purposes. Sensors will be embedded in
rooms and across spaces to facilitate such functions as climate
control, physical security, employee and equipment tracking, and

214

Id. at 62.
Id. at 62.
216
See Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 147.
217
Id. at 148.
215
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energy distribution. 218 Sensors will also be deployed across
geographically distributed systems to manage, for example,
resource delivery, supply chain management, and traffic control.219
It is not clear how individuals could be provided real time notice in
such environments, whether and to what extent individuals should
be provided with an opportunity to consent, and if so, how it could
be granted or withheld.
The advent of big data and new technologies such as mobile
applications the Internet of Things, and sensor-rich environments
pose new privacy concerns and new challenges for addressing these
concerns. Privacy concerns arise when information practices
conflict with an individual’s reasonable expectations about how
their information should be used.220 The physical characteristics of
these new technologies may make it difficult to make these new uses
visible to the individual, and these issues are exacerbated in a global
environment with varying literacy issues.
A. Big Data Analytics
Using analytics to process what is commonly referred to as “big
data”—very large data sets, rapidly gathered and compiled from
diverse sources—raises its own challenges. Analytics are often
applied to data originally collected for another purpose and
combined with data from other sources.221 The individual may be
aware of the initial collection and uses of data, but not of the

218

See generally Michael Chui, Markus Löffler, & Roger Roberts, The Internet
of Things, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Mar. 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-internet-of-things.
219
Id.
220
For example, in its 2012 Privacy Report, the FTC identified data practices
that are consistent with the context of a particular transaction or with the
organization’s relationship with a consumer as being generally consistent with
consumers’ reasonable expectations. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Protecting Consumer
Privacy.
221
Brian Hengesbaugh & Amy de La Lama, When the Big Data Surge Crashes
Against the Big Privacy Rocks: The Conflict Between the Commercial Value of
Information and Increasing Privacy Regulation, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Oct. 21
2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/when-the-big-data-surge-crashes-against-the-bigprivacy-rocks-the-conflict.
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subsequent analytic processing.222 Further, the information may also
be shared with and used by third parties of whom the individual is
not aware.223 There are also calls for increased transparency around
algorithms when these are applied using analytics to make
automated decisions.224
Perhaps the aspect of big data analytics that poses the greatest
challenge is the nature of the processing itself. Researchers do not
approach large data sets in search of the answer to a question; rather,
they explore the data for what it may reveal.225 What results is the
use of data in ways that could not have been anticipated and
therefore, would not have been included in a privacy notice.226
Providing effective notice later, when these new uses actually
occur, is not practical—data may have been collected long before its
use and amassed from many different sources, and it may no longer
be possible to locate and contact what could be thousands of
individuals whose data was used. Further, when big data analytics
are used to create personal information from non-personal
information after collection, this poses additional challenges. 227
Absent new restrictions on data collection and use, proposals for
addressing some of the privacy and other fairness challenges of
secondary use of big data include companies’ implementation of
privacy impact assessments, privacy-by-design processes,

222

Id.
Id.
224
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Protections, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).
225
Fred Cate and Victor Mayer-Schoenberger, Notice and Consent in a World
of Big Data, MICROSOFT, at 3 (Nov. 2012), available at
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=35596.
226
Id.
227
See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014),
http://bclawreview.org/files/2014/01/03_crawford_schultz.pdf. Crawford and
Schultz cite the familiar Target example where analytics were used to infer a
customer was pregnant from her purchases, thereby creating new personal
information. Id. at 94–95.
223
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accountability programs, and ethical reviews to avoid undertaking
legal but questionable data uses.228
B. Mobile Application
Mobile applications also pose challenges to transparency that do
not exist with applications that run on a traditional PC. First, the
small screens on mobile devices provide limited space to display a
traditional privacy notice. The NTIA multi-stakeholder process
described previously 229 attempted to address this challenge by
proposing a short form notice that only addressed privacy issues
related to information considered sensitive.230 Second, applications
can access information on the user’s phone such as contacts, photos,
or actual location, even when that information is not necessary for
the application to function or may be generated by another function
on the device, such as the use of an individual’s location by a
flashlight application.231 Users may be unaware of these information
practices if they are not disclosed to the user or potential user of the
application. 232 Without awareness, it may be impossible for
individuals to make informed choices about using a particular
application. 233 Finally, the constraints of the application
environment raise questions about how and when notice should be
228

See Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment
(Sep. 2013), in BIG DATA & PRIVACY: MAKING ENDS MEET DIGEST,
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-privacy-workshop-paper-collection.
The White House Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights of February
27, 2015 also calls for privacy review boards. Some have suggested that
companies could provide transparency if they made the results of their internal
privacy reviews public. However, making such reviews public could result in
sanitized reports that don’t serve their intended purpose.
229
Privacy Multistakeholder Meeting, supra note 160.
230
Id.
231
See, e.g., Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC Charges It
Deceived
Consumers,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec.
5,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-appdeveloper-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived.
232
Id.
233
See, e.g., Rebecca Balebako et. al., “Little Brothers Watching You:” Raising
Awareness of Data Leaks on Smartphones, SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY
(SOUPS)
(July
2013)
https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/
2013/proceedings/a12_Balebako.pdf.
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provided, where the notice should be stored, and when it should be
displayed.
C. Internet of Things and Sensors
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the ability of everyday
objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive data.234
This can include automobiles, home appliances, or wearable fitness
devices among other “smart devices.”235 Mobile devices with WI-FI
or Bluetooth turned on enable sensors in physical places to receive
signals from nearby devices. For example, sensors in retail stores
can use a unique identifier broadcast by the mobile device to track
how customers move through the store; often a third-party analytics
firm may do this tracking without the customer’s knowledge.236 As
is the case with mobile applications, individuals are unlikely to be
aware of the information capabilities of these devices or the fact
their device is being tracked, highlighting the need for awareness at
the time the individual makes a purchase decision about a device or
chooses to enable a particular feature. Further, because many of
these devices may not contain a screen, let alone a small screen, they
pose even greater transparency challenges than mobile applications
and big data analytics. As a result, new and creative approaches to
disclosure are needed including decoupling the notice from the
actual device.237 For example, in its 2015 Staff Report on the Internet
of Things, the FTC suggested some alternatives to traditional web
privacy notices for the IoT such as QR codes, choices at the point of
sale, or choices during setup of the device.238
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Crawford & Schultz, supra note 227, at 5.
Id. at 7–9.
236
See Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Trade-offs in Retail Tracking, FEDERAL TRADE
COMM’N (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/
2015/04/privacy-trade-offs-retail-tracking.
237
See, e.g., Florian Schaub et. al., A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices,
Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015), Carnegie Mellon University (2015),
available at http://ra.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isr2015/CMU-ISR-15-105.pdf.
238
See Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, FEDERAL
TRADE COMM’N (January 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshopentitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf (last visited March 21, 2015).
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Until recently, the term “organizational transparency” primarily
was used as a rhetorical device or as an ad hoc construct, the
meaning of which varied by field of study. 239 For example, the
meaning of transparency differed depending upon whether one
referred to, for example, financial markets, organizational
governance or trust in online commerce.240 In their recent review of
the literature on transparency, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson define
transparency as a perception of the quality of information received
from a sender which includes three dimensions of information
quality: the degree of information disclosure (including the
perception that relevant information is received in a timely fashion),
the clarity of the disclosure, and the accuracy of the disclosure.241
Schnackenberg and Tomlinson further argue that transparency
is a mechanism to increase trust in organizations, because
information quality can enhance perceptions that an organization is
trustworthy. 242 Other research has shown that consumers are
generally willing to disclose their personal information if the
benefits of disclosure exceed the perceived risks. 243 Trust affects
consumers’ willingness to assume the risks of disclosing personal
information; it is important over the life of a customer relationship
where consumers must rely on “strangers” to protect their interests
due to information asymmetries. 244 Organizations can help create
239

A.K. Schnackenberg & E.C. Tomlinson, Organizational Transparency: A
New Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder Relationships,
J. OF MGMT. (2014).
240
Id. While the authors did not specifically address privacy notices, the
conclusions appear to be relevant to privacy.
241
Id. Given this definition, the research on traditional privacy notices and
alternative notices, most notably, that done at Carnegie Mellon University,
provide support for our assertion a notice model does not support transparency.
242
Id.; see Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical
Investigation into how Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting
Privacy Expectations Online, J. OF PUB. POL’Y AND MKTG. (2015).
243
See M. Culnan and P. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns,
Procedural Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG.
SCI. 104, 104–15 (1999).
244
Id.
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trust if they provide assurances that they will not behave
opportunistically. Therefore, good quality disclosures can signal to
individuals that a company can be trusted with their personal
information, providing the company abides by the practices
disclosed in the notice.245
By understanding the dimensions of transparency, organizations
can better improve the quality of their disclosures to stakeholders,
meet regulatory and self-regulatory requirements, and contribute to
fair data use. This work informs this Article’s recommendations for
moving beyond the current reliance on notices to a more robust
approach to transparency.246
Notice as a general concept will continue to be the starting point
for transparency. However, given the growing complexity of the
emerging data eco-system, the ubiquity of data collection, and the
incidence of real-time processing, a single notice can no longer
reasonably be expected to serve the many purposes of supporting
individual choice, regulation, and public awareness and education.
This Article proposes instead that to achieve an environment of
transparency, organizations should deploy, and policy makers
should support a variety of methods for reaching all stakeholders.247
In particular, the perceived quality of consumer disclosures should
be improved along the three dimensions of transparency: degree of
disclosure, clarity, and accuracy. We now turn to our specific
245

See M. Culnan & R. Bies, Consumer Privacy: Balancing Economic and
Justice Considerations, 59 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 323, 323–42 (2003).
246
See Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1998); see, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice
Principles in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY, (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006). Cate argues that while transparency (or
openness) is explicit in the original HEW Fair Information Principles, the OECD
Guidelines and the EU Directive, it is not mentioned in the FTC’s 1998
articulation of the FIPS where the broader goal of transparency was reduced to a
set of procedural rules against which compliance could be measured and where
notice serves as “the most fundamental principle.” Id.
247
See Michael S. Wogalter et al., WARNINGS AND RISK COMMUNICATION,
(Taylor and Francis eds., 1999). Research on risk communication argues for a
system of warnings consisting of multiple disclosures designed for multiple
audiences. Further, the design of warnings should be viewed as an integral part of
the overall system design process.
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recommendations for improving transparency including the need for
business buy-in and regulatory guidance.
A. Organizations should continue to provide comprehensive,
technical notices to facilitate the roles of regulators and
advocates.
Long notices often read like legal documents and include
comprehensive technical descriptions of data collection and use,
technologies, and complex networks of business partners and
vendors. Such notices often are of little use to individuals, who are
unwilling and uninterested in investing the time to read them, and
are often ill equipped to understand them. In spite of these familiar
shortcomings, these notices are still important and necessary to
transparency, as they provide a basis for oversight by regulators who
can use them to compare assertions about data protection against
actual practices. Comprehensive privacy notices also provide
knowledgeable experts and privacy advocates with the information
necessary to raise important societal questions about surveillance,
appropriate and inappropriate uses of data and the evolution of
technology. These notices ensure that the advances in technology
and data processing benefit from the oversight that can support
consumer protection and keep organizations accountable. However,
these notices lack the clarity and accuracy needed by individuals and
therefore, fail to provide transparency to an important group of
stakeholders.248

248

Id. Research has shown notice to play a role in building consumer trust and
promoting disclosure. For example, comprehension of online notices was found
to be positively related to both reading notices and trusting the notice. Conversely,
notices perceived by consumers to be obfuscated or excessively legalistic
contribute to skepticism. Trust in online notices has also been positively related
to lower levels of privacy concern.; see also Results of Consumer Data Privacy
Survey Reveal Critical Need for All Digital Citizens to Participate in Data
Privacy Day, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 28, 2015) http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/results-of-consumer-data-privacy-survey-reveal-critical-need-for-alldigital-citizens-to-participate-in-data-privacy-day-300026888.html. A 2014
survey by the National Cyber Security Alliance found that 83% of respondents
cited using only trusted websites and companies as a strategy to protect their
privacy; this was the second most used strategy after having a strong password.
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B. Organizations should also develop alternative forms of
disclosure for individuals, providing them with relevant
information in clear, understandable language, in a format that
promotes comprehension and that is delivered at the
appropriate time.
Comprehensive notices do not support transparency for
individuals because they are perceived as being unclear, and they
may not be available at the appropriate time. Further, they may be
too general to provide an accurate picture of the organization’s
information practices.249 In a recent study, Martin argues that the
“designed obscurity” of privacy notices achieved through the use of
ambiguous language sends a false signal to individuals and may
undercut the ability of notices to support market decisions based on
differences in information practices. 250 Therefore, alternative
disclosures are needed that are brief, succinct, and accurate yet
include the relevant information that promotes individual
understanding about data collection and use. In some environments,
these disclosures will simply communicate pertinent information. In
others, the disclosure should be designed and delivered at a time to
facilitate rational choice when choice is available, such as whether
or not to allow a mobile application to make use of the individual’s
exact location.
To create these disclosures, organizations will need to need
understand how to communicate effectively with their target
audiences. Consumer disclosures should include only the
information that is most relevant and meaningful to a specific
audience at a particular time. They should also disclose appropriate
information about how data is used at a particular point in time. In
249

See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the
Notice and Choice Framework, (TPRC, 42nd Research Conference on
Communication, Information, and Internet Policy 2014). For example,
Reidenberg and his colleagues argue that broad or vague statements about
collection practices are the functional equivalent of an absence of notice.
Incomplete notice results when information collection occurs outside the scope of
the firm’s notice.
250
See Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical
Investigation into how Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting
Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. OF PUB. POL. AND MKTG. 210, 210 (2015).
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some cases, they should alert the individual about the specific data
practice, particularly if the practice is unexpected as is the case with
newer technologies described previously. 251 Firms will need to
understand what information individuals need and develop methods
for communicating this information quickly and clearly. In
particular, it is necessary to understand how to effectively
communicate information in specific situations, and how people
process this information. 252 Solutions can include layered text
notices and alternatives to text. One such example are “visceral
notices,” which include auditory or visual prompts embedded in a
particular technology and activated at the appropriate moment while
the individual is using the product to alert the individual that the
product is collecting personal information.253 Existing research on
labels and warnings may also prove instructive here. 254
It will also be important to develop ways to make the notice
clearly available and easily located at the time of decision-making
or “just-in-time.” This is particularly true for new technologies with
small screens or no screens at all, or for situations where multiple
parties are involved in collecting or delivering information. For
example, many mobile applications now offer notice the first time
the application attempts to collect sensitive information, or to use
information in a way that is unexpected. For some technologies, an
“it takes a village” approach may be appropriate where
responsibility for delivering notice is shared among business
partners. For example, for mobile applications, initial notice may be
provided by an application store so the user can review an
application’s information practice before they decide to download
251

Florian Schaub et. al., A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices,
Symposium, Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015), Carnegie Mellon
University (2015) http://ra.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isr2015/CMU-ISR-15-105.pdf.
252
See, e.g., Michael S. Wogalter et al., supra note 247.
253
See generally Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And
Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012).
254
For more information on label and warning research, see generally George
R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why
Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 JOURNAL OF
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 2, 15–29 (2004). See also Privacy Nutrition Labels,
CYLAB USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LABORATORY (last visited Apr. 5, 2016)
https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/privacyLabel/.
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it. This approach may also be appropriate for behavioral advertising,
data brokers, and the collection of information from sensors
operated by third parties where the individual is unaware of the firm
collecting their information and does not have a relationship with
it. 255 The Internet of Things, in particular, will require creative
approaches to notice, particularly where devices may not have a
screen and where collection of information is unexpected or not
obvious or visible.256
C. Notices should be developed as part of privacy-by-design
Because privacy notices have served an integral role in
regulation (see Section II above), legal counsel has usually been
tasked with drafting notices independent of the development of the
applications described in the notice. Based on an inventory of the
kind and method of data collection, the nature of the data use, and
the security measures implemented, lawyers have written notices
that are comprehensive and designed to avoid liability. Importantly,
because notices are often viewed as a vehicle for compliance, they
largely have been drafted at the end of the system development
process, after decisions about data practices have been implemented.
The drafting and posting of the notice has often been one of the final
steps an organization takes before rolling out a technology or data
driven service. In some cases, organizations have side-stepped the
review of their data practices as part of their drafting process and
have looked instead to boiler-plate notice language as their starting
point. 257 Given this disconnect, the rapid development cycles in
255

An example is where retail or other locations contract with an analytics firm,
who use sensors to perform mobile tracking for the retailer. A retailer who has
contracted with the analytics firm and who has direct contact with the consumer
bears major responsibility for notifying their customers about the tracking.
256
The FTC called for innovation in notices in its 2014 report on the Internet of
Things.
257
When privacy notices are viewed as a compliance responsibility, overseen
by the legal department, the rapid pace of system development makes it difficult
to coordinate the privacy notice with new features of the application.
Representatives of tech companies made this point during the discussion of this
Article at the 2015 Privacy Law Scholars Conference (PLSC). PLSC operates
under Chatham House Rules so comments cannot be attributed to a specific
individual.
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many firms increases the likelihood that their privacy notice will not
reflect the details of current data practices.
Over the past several years, some companies have adopted an
approach to privacy governance that involves looking at and
implementing privacy considerations throughout the entire design
and development process.258 Developers, legal staff, and compliance
officers at various points in the development cycle question the
collection, use, sharing, and protection for data, asking question
like: What data are we collecting? Is all of this data necessary? What
measures are we employing to secure the data? With whom do we
plan to share it, and why? Can we offer the individual the
opportunity to consent or exercise choice about the use of his or her
data? If so, how can we build that into the user experience?
While privacy-by-design increasingly is considered
fundamental to responsible governance within organizations, it has
focused almost exclusively on data practices, often as they are
implemented in technology. Yet privacy-by-design also offers an
opportunity to build and improve transparency. It allows
organizations the chance to create notices that are suited to the
particular service or device. Rather than add them on at the end,
privacy notices can be integrated into the design of the system.
Doing so could result in notices that are more relevant, communicate
better to individual users, and become part of the user’s interaction
with the device or system. Designers, supported by compliance,
legal, and appropriate personnel, can take advantage of these
support opportunities and overcome the constraints of the system
when designing notice. They can identify points in the system where
the most useful, appropriate information can be conveyed to the
user. Since the time at which a user encounters a notice can affect
how effective the notice is, developing the notice throughout the
design process can allow designers to provide users notice and
information at different times depending on context. It can allow for
delivery of visual or auditory notices, depending on the device or
258

This process is referred to as privacy-by-design, an approach to protecting
privacy by embedding it into the design specifications of technologies, business
practices, and physical infrastructures. See Introduction to PbD, Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (last visited Apr. 5, 2016)
https://www.ipc.on.ca/english/privacy/introduction-to-pbd/.
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data environment. It can also allow developers to take advantage of
a variety of channels by which notices can be delivered, depending
on the audience, and the constraints and opportunities of the
system.259
D. Contextual expectations should serve as a key consideration
for improving consumer notices.
Individual privacy expectations have been defined in terms of
social norms within a particular context. These norms define what
information practices are acceptable and do not raise privacy
concerns in a given context. A recent national public opinion survey
found that eighty-seven percent of individuals were concerned about
the sharing of their information with others without their knowledge
and consent, suggesting this practice violates social norms. 260
Reusing information in a way that is related to the original purpose
of the collection generally does not raise privacy concerns because
such use conforms to established social norms.261 These can include
sharing an address with a carrier who will deliver a purchase,
providing a credit card number to a bank for payment processing,
internal operations, fraud prevention or first-party marketing. 262
Because these uses are obvious and/or widely accepted and often do
not involve choice, they may need only a brief or even no mention
in the consumer notice. On the other hand, heightened attention to
259

See Florian Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam L. Durity, Lorrie Faith
Cranor, Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS): A Design Space
for Effective Privacy Notices, (July 22–24, 2015), Ottawa, Canada (Unpublished
and on file with SOUPS).
260
See National Cyber Security Alliance, Results of Consumer Data Privacy
Survey Reveal Critical Need for All Digital Citizens to Participate in Data
Privacy Day (Jan. 28, 2015), https://staysafeonline.org/about-us/news/results-ofconsumer-data-privacy-survey-reveal-critical-need-for-all-digital-citizens-toparticipate-in-data-privacy-day.
261
See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford Law Books
2010); see also Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical
Investigation into how Complying with a Privacy Notice is Related to Meeting
Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. OF PUB. POL’Y AND MKTG. 2, 210–27 (2015).
262
See Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, Federal Trade
Commission (Mar. 2012), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
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transparency is needed for information processing which is not
reasonable in light of the context and violates consumer
expectations.263 Potential contextual issues can be assessed as part of
privacy-by-design or during a separate review such as a privacy
impact assessment.
E. Technology should promote transparency by supporting the
availability and utility of notice.
While initial efforts at technological solutions have enjoyed
limited success, technology may still play a significant role in
fostering better transparency. Just as developments in technology
and data processing have enabled powerful new offerings in
products and services, such advances arguably should also enable
more effective transparency that empowers individuals.
One example of such work is the Usable Privacy Policy Project
at Carnegie Mellon University. 264 The project responds to the
limitations of natural language, privacy notices, and other obstacles
by addressing the problem using machine implementable standards,
the project builds on recent advances in natural language processing,
privacy preference modeling, crowdsourcing, formal methods, and
privacy interfaces. 265 The goal of the project is to develop a
technological approach that would (1) semi-automatically extract
key privacy policy elements from natural language notices posted
on websites and (2) present these elements to users in a format that
is easy to read and understand.266 For users, the project holds out the
possibility of access to notices that would inform privacy decisionmaking. For website operators, it promises a way to overcome the
limitations of existing natural language notices without imposing
new requirements.
In addition to machine-readable notices, technology can also
provide alternatives to traditional text notices. These can include
263

For example, the Obama Administration’s 2015 discussion draft of its 2015
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act calls for a risk analysis and specifies notice
requirements for data practices that are not reasonable in light of context.
264
See
generally
The
Usable
Privacy
Policy
Project,
http://www.usableprivacy.org/learn_more (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
265
Id.
266
Id.
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images, icons, LEDs, or even auditory notices in the form of sounds
or spoken word.267 The mode by which a notice is delivered is best
selected to attract the individual’s attention given the context.
Further, independent of how disclosures are delivered, notice design
is most effective when developed as part of the overall system
design and subjected to consumer testing prior to rollout.
F. Public education should work at the core of efforts to promote
transparency.
In addition to the issues discussed above, transparency requires
the public be broadly informed about data collection and use – not
only on an application-by-application basis, but also as a foundation
for navigating the data ecosystem at large. This public awareness
fosters greater understanding about data uses, their benefits to the
individual and to society, and the risks that they raise. It also
enhances understanding of when individual choice is available and
when it is not, and the rationale behind the distinction. It provides
clear guidance about an individual’s rights in her data, how she can
exercise her rights, and where she can go to correct mistakes or
obtain recourse when a company misuses data or fails to meet its
obligations as articulated in law or the policies in its notice. Because
privacy notices cannot both educate individuals about these issues
and be timely, succinct, and clear; public education must be a
separate and ongoing initiative. For example, the success of the
nutrition label is due in part because the label was accompanied by
an extensive, distinct consumer education effort. 268 This effort
continues in the form of ongoing media coverage of nutrition as an
element of health. As the experience with the nutrition label
demonstrated, public education is not a one-time event and it is a
responsibility that should be shared by the public and private
sectors.269
267

Michael S. Wogalter et al., supra note 247.
See FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS:
PROMOTING HEALTHIER CHOICES, (Ellen A. Wartella et al. eds. 2011); Archon
Fung, Mary Graham, & David Weil, Full Disclosure, The Perils and Promise of
Transparency 96 (2007).
269
The FTC has engaged in public education around emerging privacy risks,
complying with FTC regulations and best practices. While some of the most
268
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To make notice work as a vehicle for transparency, education
must not only become the norm but should also be made more
visible and easily accessible to the public. Brief, one-time attempts
at public education prompted by some event or the release of some
product or application will not be sufficient. Data collection that is
ubiquitous, invisible, and integrated into infrastructures, requires
that the public be apprised of how the ecosystem works and how it
is evolving, particularly when these forms of data use are new,
unexpected, and possibly violate current contextual norms. But
while public education is critical, it does not obviate the need for the
comprehensive notice and the consumer-focused notice we
described earlier. Nor does it relieve companies of the responsibility
to engage in responsible, ethical data practices. Rather, education is
an essential complement to notice as it enables the public to make
rational choices about data use, when available, based on a full
understanding of a particular data ecosystem. Moreover, if
individuals are educated, abbreviated notices or notification icons
are more likely to effectively provide them with needed information.
270

notable instances of public education have been in the area of identity theft, which
were targeted at consumers, many are focused on the business community. See
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Privacy Challenges and Opportunities: The Role of the
Federal Trade Commission, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 4, 4–9 (2014).
270
The use of sensors and beacons in retail environments provides a useful
example. Here, the retailer contracts with a third party analytics firm to track
customer behavior using their mobile devices. Transparency in this environment
poses a challenge because a third party tracks the mobile devices, consumers may
not be aware of the tracking, and it is difficult to provide useful in-store notice.
Transparency would be improved if the retailer developed an icon to provide
notice when tracking was occurring, the stores agreed to display the icon, and
consumers were educated about the benefits and risks of these technologies, the
icon, and their available choices, if they had any, to limit the tracking if they
objected. While such an approach would not eliminate the need for the vendor to
provide the tracking service and the retailer to provide traditional notice, it would
make the tracking transparent. See About Smart Places, FUTURE OF PRIVACY
FORUM, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/issues/smart-places/.
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G. Better transparency will depend on regulatory guidance 1and
business buy-in.
Proposals for providing consumers with an alternative notice
that provides selected information absent a safe harbor have in the
past raised concerns about opening companies to liability for failing
to provide comprehensive descriptions of their data practices.
Requiring both an abbreviated and a comprehensive notice would
eliminate such liability concerns. However, this approach may call
for legislation or regulation to provide organizations with clarity and
assurances about their legal responsibilities and to reduce industry
concerns about risk of exposure to regulatory action. While this
occurred for the GLB model notice, developing guidance that is
sufficiently specific yet applies across industries to a wide variety of
business models and information practices is challenging. However,
if regulators are unable or unwilling to offer a safe harbor for
adopting a consumer notice that fulfills certain conditions provided,
or to provide other motivation for business to act, the business
community will likely resist this proposal. For example, Smith
found that given the ambiguous external environment, executives
rarely take active steps to develop new privacy practices absent
some external event that forces them to act. 271 Recent events
continue to provide support for his findings. The FTC content
analysis of websites and its 2009 report on online behavioral
advertising resulted in adoption of online privacy notices and the
development of the AdChoices icon without new legislation. 272
Regulators could advance transparency for consumers, for example,
by conducting web surveys to assess whether firms are complying
with existing regulations related to notice visibility and usability.
Further, where appropriate, the FTC should decline to endorse any
271

See H. Jeff Smith, Privacy Policies and Practices: Inside the Organizational
Maze, 36 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 104, 105–22 (1993).
272
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. In the Preliminary Staff Report, the
FTC recognized the increase in privacy notices after the initial web sweeps;
however, it also stated that a large number of the notices analyzed in the study
were incomplete in terms of the basic elements of fair information practices. Id.
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solution resulting from either an industry-developed self-regulatory
program or a government-led multi-stakeholder process that has not
been subjected to rigorous consumer testing to demonstrate its
effectiveness. Absent pressure from government, business
community leadership, and collaboration with consumer and
privacy advocates, notices will fail to provide individuals with the
usable information they need about data practices.
Transparency should not pose a threat to organizations, and in
fact, for responsible companies, transparency will enhance their
relationship with consumers and customers. One study found that
when privacy information is made more salient, some consumers are
willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective
websites. What is particularly interesting about this study is that the
participants in the experiment used their own credit cards to make
actual purchases rather than just stating their intentions. The authors
hypothesize that where there is transparency and privacy
protections, privacy may serve as a selling point. 273 Where
companies provide value in exchange for the use of their data,
transparency enables consumers to evaluate the risk-benefit tradeoff
for disclosure. 274 Therefore, transparency does not pose a threat;
rather, it promotes consumer trust and the innovative, responsible
use of data.
IX.
CONCLUSION
Notices currently serve many purposes, including to provide a
basis for individual choice; serve as the basis for regulation, promote
public awareness of data practices, and enable oversight by privacy
experts and advocates of issues related to the collection, processing,
and protection of information about individuals. The process of
creating notices also provides an opportunity for organizations to
review and understand their data collection practices and make
273

See Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on
Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INF. SYS. RES. 254, 254–68
(2011).
274
See Naveen F. Awad & M.S. Krishan, The Personalization Privacy
Paradox: An Empirical Evaluation of Information Transparency and the
Willingness to be Profiled Online for Personalization, 30 MIS QUARTERLY 13,
13–28 (2006).
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responsible decisions about internal data flows and external data
uses. This Article discussed the shortcomings of traditional notices
as a tool for promoting individual choice. It described the results of
efforts to improve them through the use of layered or short notices
and reviewed attempts to develop technological alternatives to
traditional notice. Finally, it identified the challenges that new
technologies such as big data, mobile environments, and the Internet
of Things pose to notice.
This Article further argues that the way data is collected, used,
processed, and stored in the emerging data eco-system requires not
simply improved notices, but a multi-pronged approach to
informing the individual about data and privacy practices that
promotes an overall environment of transparency. As this Article
notes in the opening sections, transparency is a condition of
disclosure and awareness created by organizations that involves the
use of an array of methods, notice among them. Whether
transparency is achieved depends on the extent to which information
is disclosed—its timeliness, its clarity, and its accuracy. The authors
conclude that while notice is central to transparency, transparency
involves far more than notice; they agree that notices as currently
implemented must be fixed, however, even if improved, notices will
not be sufficient to achieve transparency the evolving data
ecosystem requires more.
Finally, this Article identifies the shortcomings of the current
privacy regime as well as new challenges the twenty-first century
data ecosystem poses for transparency. Further, while transparency
is a necessary condition for fair data use, it alone is not sufficient,
since all of the fair information principles contribute to fairness.
While moving from notice to transparency poses its own challenges
to both regulators and business, a combination of improved notices,
attention to contextual norms, integration of the design of notices
into the system development process as part of privacy-by-design,
public education, and new technological solutions hold promise for
addressing the current situation where there is agreement across a
range of stakeholders that current privacy notices are simply not
working.
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